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“News resources today indicate that at least seven atypical pneumonia
cases were reported in Wuhan, China. Their health authorities replied to the
media that the cases were believed not to be SARS; however, the samples
are still under examination, and cases have been isolated for treatment.”
On December 31, 2019, the Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC) sent
the above message via email to the International Health Regulations (IHR) focal
point under the World Health Organization (WHO). In the meantime, Taiwan
also initiated COVID-19 epidemic prevention measures. This article endeavors
to explain Taiwan’s emergency command and response system, to summarize
Taiwan’s current regulatory actions against the epidemic outbreak, and to provide
a few remarks on the emergency measures undertaken from the perspective of
constitutionalism.
Legal Framework: Emergency Decrees vs
Emergency Acts
Since the outbreak of COVID-19, various parties have urged President Tsai Ing-
wen to issue an emergency decree in accordance with Article 2 (3) of Additional
Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China (Taiwan).1)"The president may,
by resolution of the Executive Yuan Council, issue emergency decrees and take all
necessary measures to avert imminent danger affecting the security of the State or
of the people or to cope with any serious financial or economic crisis, the restrictions
in Article 43 of the Constitution notwithstanding. However, such decrees shall, within
ten days of issuance, be presented to the Legislative Yuan for ratification. Should
the Legislative Yuan withhold ratification, the said emergency decrees shall forthwith
cease to be valid.” https://english.president.gov.tw/Page/95. Until now, however, the
possibility of issuing an emergency decree has never been considered. Based on my
observations, there are three main reasons for the reluctance.
First, owing to the severe lessons drawn from the experience with the Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic in 2003, Taiwan has already made
substantial improvements to the legal mechanism for the prevention and treatment
of contagious diseases. During SARS, Taiwan was not informed by the WHO due
to international exclusion. This led to a chaotic experience in treating hundreds of
infection cases without international support and the controversial lockdown of one
hospital in Taipei. Despite the difficulties, dedicated efforts by the government and
the people of Taiwan, along with the enactment of the “Provisional Act for Prevention
and Relief Measures for Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome” (hereinafter SARS
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Act) which was effective from March 15, 2003 to December 31, 2004, had the SARS
outbreak in Taiwan under control by July 5, 2003. A total of 346 cases were recorded
as confirmed SARS cases. Among them, 73 died, of which 37 died directly from
SARS.
Such an experience prompted Taiwan to take a precautionary approach in facing
contagious diseases, as exemplified by the total revision of the Communicable
Disease Control Act (hereinafter “CDC Act”) in 2004. The SARS Act expired on
December 31, 2004 and was incorporated into the CDC Act. Furthermore, the
CDC Act has since been amended many times. The latest amendment was in
June 2019. The emergency response mechanism for contagious diseases is
generally stated in the CDC Act, including, inter alia, the improvement of the disease
classification models, the establishment of a centralized disease control system for
recognition, the announcement and removal of epidemic conditions and affected
areas of communicable diseases, the enhancement of disease control measures, the
requirement of informed consent to record, videotape or photograph patients under
isolation care, home-based quarantine, concentration camp quarantine and their
families etc.
Second, at precisely 13:56 on February 25, 2020, the Parliament has already passed
“the Special Act for Prevention, Relief and Revitalization Measures for Severe
Pneumonia with Novel Pathogens” (hereinafter “COVID-19 Special Act”). At 17:30
on the same day, the President announced this Act. The interval between enactment
and promulgation only took about 2 hours. This Act is effective from January 15,
2020 to June 30, 2021. Upon the date of its expiry, the term of the Act may be
extended with approval of the Parliament. Although there is no time limit for the
extension, the Act is unlikely to be extended from the experience in implementing
the SARS Act. In terms of legislative procedures and regulatory effectiveness, the
COVID-19 Special Act has equivalent effects to the issuance of emergency decrees.
Third, the authorization of an administrative order through an emergency decree in
Taiwan became less appealing than through law after 2002. The background of this
shift is outlined as follows. After a catastrophic earthquake in Taiwan on September
21, 1999, the President issued an emergency decree in response to the earthquake
on September 25, 1999. The Government drafted and submitted to the Parliament,
the “Emergency Decree Execution Outline of September, 1999” (hereinafter “the
Execution Outline”). Members of the Parliament applied to the Judicial Yuan
(Taiwan’s Constitutional Court) for an interpretation as to the constitutionality of the
Execution Outline.
In the 2002 J.Y. Interpretation No. 543, the Constitutional Court upheld that in
principle, the content of emergency decrees should be thorough and detailed
so they can be executed swiftly without the need for supplementary regulations.
When there are time constraints and in cases in which provisions for detail and
technicality are impracticable, the decrees must contain provisions expressing
precise objectives and may only be proclaimed after ratification by the Parliament.
Since the authorization of an administrative order through an emergency decree is
more restrictive than through law, in cases of an emergency, (such as the SARS
in 2003, the flood in August 8, 2009 and the earthquakes in 2016 and 2018), no
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emergency decree has been issued. Such emergencies are tackled by way of
legislation and administrative orders.
Proactive Prevention Strategies and Measures
against COVID-19
Taiwan’s current emergency management of COVID-19 is based on the democratic
process of the legislature and adopts proactive prevention strategies and measures.
This can be explained in terms of organization and function.
Regarding the organization, on January 20, 2020, the Ministry of Health and
Welfare (MOHW), in accordance with Article 17 (1) of the CDC Act, upon reporting
to the Government for approval, established the “Central Epidemics Command
Center” (CECC) to fight COVID-19. The CECC was positioned at the third level
within the hierarchy of the central government.
On January 23, 2020, after the confirmation of the first case of COVID-19 in Taiwan
on January 21, 2020, the CECC was upgraded from level 3 to level 2 in the central
government. The Minister of MOHW, Dr. Shih-Chung Chen, was designated by the
Premier as the commander in this COVID-19 battle.
On February 27, 2020, due to the increasing number of confirmed cases,
the Premier decided to upgrade the CECC to the first level within the central
establishment. This means the authority of the prevention against COVID-19 is the
Premier, while Dr. Shih-Chung Chen continued to serve as the commander.
As for the functional aspect of the emergency response, since December 31,
2019 Taiwan has carried out boarding, quarantine and other related preventive
measures to protect against potentially infected flight passengers and crew departing
from Wuhan. On January 15, 2020, the MOHW announced that “Severe Special
Infectious Pneumonia” will be included in the fifth category of statutory contagious
diseases in accordance with Article 3 (1) of the CDC Act.
On this basis, the anti-epidemic measures were adopted by CECC. Some of the
most important measures concerning the deprivation and restrictions of physical
freedom of a person, freedom of movement, and property rights are outlined as
follows.
• Entry control: All entry is prohibited for people from China. People from Hong
Kong and Macao are prohibited from entry with the exception of business travel.
From March 19, foreigners are prohibited from entering Taiwan. All entrants
must be quarantined at home for 14 days. From March 24 to April 30, transit of
airline passengers through Taiwan is prohibited.
• Exit control: For teaching staff and students below the senior high school level,
all exits are prohibited except under exceptional circumstances until the end
of June. Medical Personnel and social workers in the hospital who plan to go
to tourist areas with a level three threat warning are required to report to the
MOHW for review.
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• Quarantine measures: There are four types of measures in place: mandatory
isolation, at-home isolation, at-home quarantine, and independent health
management. The first type is intended for confirmed cases, requiring isolation
of these cases until the treatment test is negative. At-home quarantine is
conducted for those who have been in contact with confirmed cases, tracking
their health status twice a day. At-home quarantine is designated for all
immigrants since March 19, which tracks one to two times a day to inquire about
their health status. Both at-home isolation and at-home quarantine prohibit
people from leaving home. Electronic surveillance has been used to monitor the
footprints of each case. Lastly, independent health management are imposed
on cases that has been reported. For those who are tested negative and do not
need to be quarantined, they are still advised to stay home.
• Medical supplies control: Starting from January 24, 2020, the export of N95
masks and surgical masks is prohibited for one month. On January 30,
2020, all mask production lines for mask manufacturers nationwide were
to be requisitioned by the government. The Ministry of Economy entered
into contracts with private manufacturers to purchase mask manufacturing
equipment and increase production. With a system of mask allocation based
on real names, people need to use their National Health Insurance Card to
purchase masks at special health insurance designated pharmacies or health
centers. (The national health Insurance program is compulsory for all citizens
starting from birth, with most hospitals, pharmacies and health centers linked to
the system.)
• Social distance limits: People who take public transportation must wear masks.
Taxis including UBER must wear masks, and drivers may refuse to carry
passengers who refuse to abide by this rule to ensure the safety of drivers.
From April 9, the operations of host and hostess clubs and ballrooms in Taiwan
were suspended.
Impact Assessment of the Measures Undertaken
from the Perspective of Constitutionalism
To date, Taiwan’s government has not issued an emergency decree while deploying
Taiwan’s legal measures against COVID-19, but instead responded to the outbreak
through the general legislative process. During this period, no state organs have
been shut down. The Congress and courts have remained well-functioning under this
democratic legal system despite the health crisis. For example, the Constitutional
Court still heard oral arguments in court on March 31, 2020. Online meetings
will only be considered when necessary. In particular, it is worth noting that most
measures are temporary; there is a sunset clause embedded in the COVID-19
Special Act.
Regarding the deprivation or restriction of people’s rights, measures that may
impact fundamental rights such as freedom of movement, property rights, personal
freedom, and privacy should be highly scrutinized under this emergency situation.
Nevertheless, due to the early deployment of resources and rapid containment
of the epidemic, compared to other countries, there are currently no large-scale
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store closure measures, travel restrictions, or physical contact bans initiated. Nor
does Taiwan have curfews, stay-at-home orders or shutdown-of-the-city orders
that undermines normal basic living functions. The agile responses and advanced
deployment, as well as the precautionary approach, have been fully implemented.
Furthermore, the precautionary and preventive measures are appropriately enforced
so that the width and intensity of interference of fundamental rights are minimized.
As of writing after confirmation of the first case of COVID-19 on January 21, 2020,
of 420 confirmed cases in Taiwan, 341 are imported and 55 are indigenous while 24
are Navy members on the fleet. Of the confirmed cases, there have been 6 deaths,
and 189 patients have been released from isolation, with the remainder remaining
hospitalized in isolation.
As such, Taiwan has complied with the principle of proportionality while executing
regulatory measures against the epidemic. If the COVID-19 Special Act itself is
unconstitutional, a lawsuit may be filed with the Constitutional Court of Taiwan. For
the various restrictive measures imposed by CECC, a lawsuit may be filed to seek
relief through the Administrative courts. Additionally, a temporary remedy system,
such as a suspension of execution or provisional injunction, may be deposed. But so
far, there are no cases being sought against such precautionary measures.
With respect to the separation of powers, the central government’s level of epidemic
prevention has been instantly raised to the first level, resulting in the centralization
of the authority against the epidemic. Such actions also avoid the problem of
unclear powers allocations or the overriding powers among different levels of central
authorities. Admittedly, from the perspective of the vertical separation of powers,
there is a clear tendency for centralization, and local authority is greatly restricted.
However, given the high population density and the rapid spread of the epidemic
in Taiwan, it is technically difficult to precisely distinguish and allocate the authority
between the local governments and the central government. Decisions of local
restrictions, such as the closure of theaters and other entertainment facilities, were
even pushed by the local government to the central government, claiming that
ultimate authority rests with the central government. Meanwhile, some different
approaches devised by the central government were also adopted by a few local
governments, which have resulted in a more restrictive tendency, yet has had its
positive significance in terms of epidemic prevention.
However, in the long run, protection of privacy over personal information is a
worrisome issue. This issue is particularly prominent at this moment, given that
epidemic prevention and control require information on the “tourism history”
and “action footprints”. Moreover, some travel histories or action footprints of
confirmed cases were disclosed. Furthermore, the application of digital technology
as pandemic prevention tools should especially be highlighted. We need to be
cautioned that whether the various information search mechanisms that are
employed to control COVID-19 information, such as using cell-phone signal as
electronic fence to monitor at-home isolation cases, excessively violate the people’s
right to information privacy. Will the personal information linked or integrated by the
government be terminated after the epidemic has ended? While feeling proud for
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Taiwan’s success in preventing epidemics, we must also contemplate these legal
issues.
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